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INTRODUCTION
The 1980s have witnessed a dramatic change in economic policies in the
developing countries (DCs). Triggered by the oil shock and severe terms of trade
shifts for most DCs, and the concomitant rise in the cost of foreign borrowing,
governments in the Southern hemisphere faced the twin problems of transferring
domestic resources abroad, and at the same time engineering a transfer of private
savings into the public pocket. While the first half of the decade was marked by
the advent of the debt crisis in 1982, since the mid 1980s we have seen an
increasing number of countries embarking on macroeconomic adjustment and
structural reform.
Unfortunately, economic theory has followed rather than led these
developments. There was an early recognition that distortions were bad for
economic growth (Agarwala, 1983) and hence structural adjustment, understood
as the attempt to regain the pre-shock growth path (Balassa, 1989), would
involve microeconomic reforms to increase efficiency of resource use alongside
macroeconomic demand management. However, on a comparative level we still
lack a comprehensive understanding of the conditions which make structural
adjustment succeed. Most country sample studies focus on the evaluation of
World Bank structural adjustment loans (SALs) to assess the effects of policy
conditionality (World Bank, 1988; 1990; 1992; Mosley et al., 1991). There have
also been sectoral studies on the behaviour of industry (Hettige et al., 1991),
investment (Serven and Solimano, 1991), or public sector management
(Nunberg, 1991). Finally, there are a host of case studies on individual
adjustment experiences (Corbo and de Melo, 1985; Sachs et al., 1989; Bruno et
al., 1991; Mosley et al., 1991; also Michaely et al., 1991; Fontaine ed., 1992 on
trade liberalisation). As a result we now understand much better, what went
wrong in individual cases and how to protect specific groups in an adjustment
process. Furthermore, we have seen interesting theoretical treatments on the role
of credibility in stabilisation (e.g. Guidotti and Vegh, 1992) and distortions
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;in economic growth (e.g. Easterly, 1992). What is lacking, for want of
comparable quantitative indicators, is a framework that formulates testable
hypotheses regarding the sustainability of structural adjustment rather than
performing mere before/after or with/without comparisons.
The lack of such a framework has been particularly serious in the recent reform
experiences of Central and Eastern Europe. Although Western advisers were
quick to come out with broad policy recommendations (Lipton and Sachs, 1990;
Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Siebert, 1991) none of them predicted the
unprecedented output fall in the region. Arguably, this may be due to the
insufficient attention paid to institutional legacies, that generate conflicting
objectives for a government aiming at simultaneous marketisation and
democratisation (Raiser, 1992; Neuber, 1993; Schmieding, 1993). The belated
attention to institution building further lacks a strong notion as to what the most
important role of such institutions would be in the short to medium run. There is
a danger that the rather general attempt to incorporate institutions into economic
theory (North, 1990) leads to confusion concerning the pressing tasks of a
government under time and resource constraints.
This paper follows two aims. On the one hand, we attempt to derive lessons for
the Eastern European reform process from the experience of DCs with structural
adjustment during the 1980s. We therefore draw an admittedly shaky
comparison between the relative price shifts and institutional overhauls
associated with the oil, interest rate, and terms of trade shocks of the early 1980s
(and the increasing wave of democratisation in the Third World during the
1980s) and the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe at the start of the
1990s. Our second aim is to apply a framework that has been developed to
account for the nature of a socialist economy and its reform attempts to analyse
reforms in developing countries. This is the concept of soft budget constraints,
related to loose financial discipline in the enterprise sector under conditions of
paternalistic protection by the government (Kornai, 1980). As the author of the
idea has himself argued, soft budget constraints may affect economic
performance in a capitalist market economy, too, by replacing market
coordination with bureaucratic coordination (Kornai, 1984). The considerable
degree of government intervention in many DCs, the particular importance of
parastatals in industrial production in some, and the explicit goal of improvingthe working of markets during structural adjustment make Kornai's hypotheses a
useful background against which economic reform episodes may be studied.
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The paper starts with the analytical presentation of the concept of soft budget
constraints. The second section derives a set of general macroeconomic
indicators of budget softness from an analysis of the microeconomic aspects of
the phenomenon, drawing on selected country experiences. In the third section
we develop a typology of economic reforms in a sample of DCs, differentiating
both by the nature of initial conditions and the sustainability of different reform
patterns. An attempt is made to fit the cases of Central and Eastern Europe
somewhere into this typology. The fourth section presents some empirical data
on indicators of budget softness. From this a budget softness index is
constructed to test whether the concept yields-additional insights on the
sustainability of economic reforms and economic performance during structural
adjustment in DCs. The fifth section summarises our main findings and draws
some conclusions for the economic transformation process in Central and
Eastern Europe.
I. WHAT IS THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT?
In a market economy an economic actor's budget constraint is given by the stock
of her monetary wealth, which limits her maximum expenditure in each period.
This limit may be exceeded temporarily by borrowing, but trading current for
future expenditure carries a cost, expressed by the interest rate. In Janos Kornai's
(1980) analysis of the shortage economy this relationship between wealth and
expenditure does not hold for all economic actors. In the productive sphere
claims on material resources dictate the provision of their monetary counterparts
by the financial system. In other words, the budget constraint for enterprises is
soft. At the level of the economy in general budget constraints are softened if
a) buyers do not pay for the goods they buy,
b) debtors do not honour their debt contracts,
c) tax payers do not pay taxes, and
d) producers do-not cover their costs out of their revenue (Kornai, 1993).
Typically, only enterprises have sufficient economic and political weight to
violate budgetary constraints and, hence, the concept applies primarily to the
productive sector of an economy. Nonetheless, the consequences are felt at the
This is in line with the concern to improve public sector management expressed in
the World Development Report (WDR), 1988. We suggest that the hardness^of
budget constraints is a benchmark for successful public sector reforms. f^"macroeconomic level in general. An economy with soft budget constraints for
enterprises is characterised by two outstanding features. First, money is largely
passive and monetary policy is impotent. Second, economic incentives for
producers are geared towards the securing of material claims rather than towards
the maximisation of disposable monetary income. As a result of the first aspect,
inflation is an automatic effect of loosening price controls in planned economies
and price elasticities of demand in the industrial sector are close to zero.
2 From
the second element of an economy with soft budget constraints it follows, that
political power and leverage with the government count for more than economic
power.
3 Both features entail that prices loose their signalling role in the
economy with important detrimental effects for allocative efficiency.
The analysis of the effects of soft budget constraints is not restricted to socialist
economies. Any enterprise that faces no sanctions if it doesn't pay its bills or if
its costs exceed its revenue has a soft budget constraint. In an economy where
the government tolerates a large number of loss makers, competitive selection is
impeded. The government faces a particular problem if those enterprises
threatened with market exit are either publicly owned or represent important
allies in the prevailing political coalition.
4 If the institutional mechanisms that
guarantee the survival of loss makers are sufficiently engrained to influence the
expectations of economic actors permanently, even a reform minded government
may encounter substantial credibility obstacles in making clear that it will not
bail anyone out in the future.
5 As many authors have made clear, however, the
credibility and enforcement of bankruptcy regulations is the crucial disciplinary
device in a market economy (Kornai, 1990; Brada, 1992; Williamson, 1992). If
soft budget constraints impede the effective application of this device, if, in
other words current policies and institutional legacies create and maintain a
"no-exit economy", economic reforms are elusive and economic performance is
likely to suffer.
From the above discussion, clear implications emerge concerning the role of soft
budget constraints for the sustainability of economic reforms and structural
For a clarification of this idea and an interesting debate, see Gomulka (1985) and
Kornai's (1985) reply.
See Etzioni (1988) for a typology of possible combinations of, and interactions
between, political and economic power.
Note the affinity of this argument to the literature on the political economy of
developing countries. For two very distinct approaches see Evans' (1979) "triple
alliance" concept and the analysis of "rent seeking" behaviour (Krueger, 1974).
This is a variety of the familiar moral hazard problem. For a summary of the
literature regarding the role of credibility in economic reforms, see Funke (1991).adjustment in DCs. Typically, pressures on enterprises will result cither from the
reduction of overall state support due to fiscal consolidation during stabilisation,
or from increasing market competition due to trade liberalisation and
privatisation. In short, we can formulate the following three core hypotheses:
First, macroeconomic stabilisation is unsustainable and incredible as long as
money is not fully active. This implies that tight monetary policies alone may
not prevent firms from acting under a soft budget constraint. This contention is
somewhat contradictory and needs elaboration. When money is passive, this
does not mean that the link between money supply and inflation is cut. Soft
budget constraints do, however, imply that the conventional instalments of
credit control may not be operative, because economic actors do not react to
relative price shifts, but continue credit distribution according to criteria very
little related to expected returns. The resulting adverse selection in credit
markets may undermine monetary austerity by ushering in a financial crisis, and
an ultimate bail-out by the state.
6 Microeconomic reforms that remove incentive
distortions are a necessary complement to fiscal and monetary austerity in
sustaining stabilisation programmes. In the absence of price controls economies
with soft budget constraints will have higher and more volatile inflation.
Second, in liberalising an economy the removal of protection must proceed on
all fronts to be effective.
7 If protection is of the budget softness type, i.e. is used
to prevent the closure of inefficient producers, then a phasing of structural
adjustment by continuing to limit competitive pressures in some areas will
increase rather than reduce transition costs. Radical liberalisers will recover
more quickly than gradual movers.
Third, the low price elasticities associated with budget softness and the general
discretionary nature of government intervention resulting from the nature of the
paternalistic state (Kornai, 1986) may depress economic activity even in the long
run.
8 A proper testing of this hypothesis would require a characterisation of state
6 We expand on this point below, when introducing indicators of budget softness.
See also Raiser (1992).
7 This is in line with arguments for a critical minimal mass of reforms to reap
significant efficiency gains (Williamson, 1992). In Easterly's (1992) endogenous
growth model with price distortions, the minimum reform effort depends on
substitution elasticities between two types of capital, e.g. domestic and
international technologies. One could reformulate his idea by contending that soft
budget constraints reduce substitution elasticities, because price signals are
deficient. It follows that reforms must be comprehensive.
8 This is easily understood within the framework of an endogenous growth model,
where restricted exit affects the assimilation of new technology (see e.g. Edwards,
1989), or budget softness lowers substitution elasticities between international andintervention regimes in a large sample of countries over an extended period.
This goes beyond the scope of this paper. Awaiting more thorough research, we
must leave it at the contention, that tolerating loss makers limits the
Schumpeterian drive for innovation characteristic of rapid economic growth.9
Under soft budget constraints creative destruction is replaced by slow decay.
Let us now turn to the derivation of indicators for soft budget constraints. As
should be clear from the above discussion, the framework is in essence
concerned with the microeconomic incentive structure in an economy. For our
purpose this poses a problem, as the elements that describe such incentives are
rarely comparable across countries for reasons of data availability and important
institutional differences. Therefore, iit the following section we look at selected
country evidence for budget softness and relate it to associated macroeconomic
phenomena. The aim is to draw a picture of a stylised economy with soft budget
constraints by highlighting its most important components.
II. MEASURING THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
In Section I we established four areas where budget constraints could be
softened. The first three concerned the lack of financial discipline in an economy
and the inability of participants in an exchange contract to enforce it properly.
As we know from the literature on the role of institutions in economic
development (e.g. North, 1990), transactions costs rise, where binding
commitments that ensure the honouring of exchange contracts do not exist, and
third party enforcement is incredible or absent. "Thereby the benefits from the
division of labour are reduced and overall economic prosperity falls.
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0 It is thus
important to find out, whether loose financial discipline is associated with some
conspicious macroeconomic features that may help us to detect its presence. The
fourth area of budget softness concerns an aspect that is more familiar from the
literature on economic reforms in DCs. It concerns the availability of subsidies
for loss making enterprises and the degree of protection of domestic producers
from world market competition. Here, the derivation of macroeconomic
indicators will be much easier.
local production technology (Easterly, 1992). Alternatively, soft budget constraints
could lower the rate of convergence in an economy far removed from its steady
state (Summers et. al., 1993). For earlier evidence on the growth reducing effects of
price distortions, see Agarwala (1983).
9 See Gomulka (1986) for an analysis of growth and innovation in Eastern Europe.
10 See Schmieding (1993) for an interpretation of the transformation crisis in Central
and Eastern Europe that stresses a rise in transactions costs.a) Inter-Enterprise Credits and Payments Delays
The importance of payment delays and inter-enterprise credits as an aspect of
budget softness has recently been stressed by several authors (Raiser, 1992;
Kornai, 1993). Unfortunately, however, there is only very little evidence on the
level and importance of payments delays in DCs. The World Development
Report 1988, focussing on public sector management, claims that SOEs in
particular "have diminished the transparency and accountability of public
finances" (World Development Report, 1988 p. 171). However, to support such
a qualitative assessment only the case of Morocco is cited, where unpaid bills
within the public sector amounted to 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1984. If included
into the consolidated fiscal balance, inter-agency arrears would have increased
the budget deficit by 50 per cent.
For the recent cases of economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe
inter-enterprise credits, or involuntary trade credits have been recognised as a
problem and are slightly better documented. For Czechoslovakia the figures
indicate a peak at 174 bn Kcs in the fourth quarter of 1991, which corresponds
to 18 per cent of GDP. In Poland, inter-enterprise credits reached 140 per cent of
total bank credit in early 1992 (Raiser, 1992), and in Hungary involuntary trade
credits were 177 bn HUF in April 1992 (Kornai, 1993), or 23 per cent of GDP.
In a Western market economy trade credits are a common way of short term
financing of transactions, but in the light of falling profitability, overaged capital
stocks, and deep structural change, such high levels of inter-enterprise credits
are likely to indicate a problem of insolvency rather than illiquidity. Thus, it is
argued, that inter-enterprise arrears served as a substitute for bank credit after
tight money was introduced at the start of economic transformation, thereby
undermining the effectiveness of monetary policy (e.g. Begg and Portes, 1992;
Buch and Schmieding, 1992; Hrncir, 1992; Kornai, 1993). For instance, if
practically insolvent firms had access to such credits, then their financial
problems would be passed on to their suppliers. Even potentially profitable firms
would become insolvent rather than just illiquid if their dues remained
uncollectable. In such a case, in order to prevent unnecessary bankruptcies the
government may be forced to step in and bail out ailing firms.
At the macroeconomic level it is not easy to quantify this aspect of soft budget
constraints accurately. If the government decides to intervene and take over
uncollectable dues, this implies a rise in the national debt, and due to debt
service obligations in the current budget deficit, too. If this increase is
concealed, for instance by including' it in extra budgetary funds, these willnonetheless require financing.
1
1 On the assumption that the revenue base is
rather constrained in developing countries, one obvious way to finance a
government bail-out is a rise in the inflation tax. Finally, if the government
decides to leave the solution to the capital market, this will be reflected in the
level and structure of interest rates and exposes the banks to financial
difficulties.
b) The Bad Debt Problem
Bad debts in the financial sector are the counterpart to payment delays in the
goods market. When sellers do not get their money they cannot pay back their
debt. Banks may also be settled with.a portfolio of non-performing assets,
because their previous credit policies did not include a proper risk and credit
worthiness assessment. Thus during a period of financial liberalisation
prudential regulations for the banking sector are typically still weak (Bisat et al.,
1992; Fischer, 1993). Banks are used to providing credit to selected customers
by government instruction and do not care much about expected returns. As long
as their deposits grow rapidly enough to finance the roll-over of outstanding
loans, banks may increase credit to the corporate sector, regardless of its
financial health.
Bisat et al. (1992) observe a very rapid increase of private sector credit
immediately after financial liberalisation in the cases of Chile, Argentina and the
Philippines. In all three cases the growth in private sector credit initially
exceeded the growth in deposits. A large share of these loans became
non-performing during the course of the reform as can be seen from Table 1. In
order to avoid a financial panic, banks were bailed out by the government. In the
Philippines, for instance, national government contributions to public
corporations reached 3.9 per cent of GDP in 1984, while transfers to state owned
financial institutions doubled from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1984 to 3.1 per cent in
1986 (Dohner and Intal, 1989). In Argentina, the liberalisation programme was
completely reversed and the entire financial sector nationalised in 1982 (Corbo
and de Melo, 1985), while in the same year in Chile bad debts were transfered to
the Central Bank in exchange for securities with a long term maturity (Bisat et
al., 1992).
For instance both the Czech Republic and Hungary have created a national property
fund, which it is hoped will be financed out of privatisation revenues. For Poland
Begg and Portes (1992) estimate the additional national debt service, if a debt
write-off was to take place, at 2-3 per cent of GDP.In Central and Eastern Europe the bad debt problem has similarly plagued
economic reformers, and it has been acknowledged as an important aspect of the
lack of financial discipline in the emerging market economies (EMEs) (Buch
and Schmieding, 1992; Raiser, 1992; Kornai, 1993). Interestingly, its
macroeconomic consequences are very similar to the experiences of
unsuccessful financial liberalisations in DCs. As can be seen from Table 1, when
non-performing assets in the banking sector are large, gross interest margins rise
precipitously (see also Fischer, 1993), reflecting the attempt of banks to
recapitalise themselves by increasing the premium on risky lending. This is
precisely what happened in Poland and Hungary, where a huge proportion of
bank loans (30-50 per cent) are expected to be doubtful (Raiser, 1992; Estrin et
Table 1 - Non-Performing Assets of the Financial Sector, Gross Interest Rate


































































































Source: Bisatet al. (1992).10
al., 1992). Interest margins reached 56 per cent in Poland in March 1991 (Begg
and Portes, 1992) and have averaged 20 per cent since then. In Hungary, the
introduction of closer bank supervision has also led to a rise in interest margins
to around 12 per cent by the end of 1992 (GKI, 1992).
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On the macroeconomic side we can thus characterise an economy, where the
bad debt problem is large by the size of gross interest margins. Additionally, the
development of fiscal balances also provides some indication of whether
previous lending imprudence poses an additional burden on the budget.
Ironically, the assumption of such a burden may be a necessary step to harden
budget constraints effectively, inspite of the moral hazard problems associated
with it. As long as the chance for a government bail-out exists, banks may
recapitalise interest and roll over bad loans, rather than increasing provisions.
Hence more money may be poured into a financial black hole unless the
government goes for a rapid clean sweep. The contradictory nature of some of
our indicators, when taken in separation from each other, will concern us again
below.
c) Loose Tax Enforcement
Although it is undoubtedly an important aspect of budget softness, by its very
nature, the evidence on tax deferments or outright tax evasion is extremely thin.
It has been known for some time that DCs in particular have considerable
problems with the taxation of their firms and citizens. Hence, income and
corporate taxation feature as a prominent component of government revenues
only at fairly high levels of GDP per capita (Burgess and Stern, 1992). In some
medium income countries tax evasion also has to do with unrealistic levels of
taxation. Mexico, for instance, increased government revenue by 42 per cent
from 1988 to 1991, while lowering the corporate tax rate form 42 to 36 per cent.
The number of tax payers increased from 1.8 to 2.7 million (Aspe ,1992). In
Poland the stock of tax deferments in August 1992 had almost reached the level
of the cumulated budget deficit (Raiser, 1992). However, we have no evidence
for the discretionary nature of taxation, as expressed for instance in a very small
correlation between pre- and post-tax revenue at the firm level (Kornai and
Matits, 1987). The only indication we can gain of the importance of this
phenomenon is by conjecture. We posit that tax deferments should hurt revenue
2 Czechoslovakia has taken the biggest step towards the recapitalisation of banks by
transferring their doubtful claims at an 80 per cent discount to the Consolidation
Bank. The early timing of this step may explain why interest margins have
remained rather low in Czechoslovakia.11
sufficiently to make an impact on the budget deficit, if soft budget constraints
exist. Moreover, we consider two structural elements of taxation, namely by
measuring the importance of the inflation tax and trade duties for the financing
of government outlays. By conjecture again, we assume that when discretionary
tax subsidies are large, the , government's reliance on the inflation tax in




When a firm fails to cover its costs out of its revenue, in a market characterised
by perfect competition, it must exit. As we have noted before, it is the
fundamental feature of an economy with soft budget constraints that this
mechanism does not work, at least not to the full extent. The provision of
subsidies by the government to loss making firms is in principle the primary
element of a "no-exit economy". It is mentioned last here, because the recent
experience of economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe has shown
the importance of the other three areas of budget softness, in the context of
economic reforms aimed at reducing explicit subsidies substantially.
Nonetheless, in our analysis of economic reforms in DCs the various channels
through which subsidies may be provided to uncompetitive firms must be
included in the list of indicators of budget softness.
First, there is the level of direct transfers to economic units from the central
government budget.
1
4 As Figure 1 shows, direct net transfers from government
to nonfinancial SOEs alone could reach several percentage points of GDP in
some countries. In the Philippines direct transfers to public corporations were
further expanded by contributions to state owned financial institutions, that
doubled from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1984 to 3.1 per cent in 1986 (Dohner and
Intal, 1989). This brings us back to the earlier discussion on government
bail-outs during financial crises. In the Philippines credit allocation during the
final years of the Marcos regime followed criteria of political allegiance above
13 Aizenman (1991) provides a model of seignorage along these lines.
14 We exclude local budgets, although in some cases they provide a substantial share
of budgetary subsidies. However, as we want to compute the share of subsidies in
central government expenditure, this differentiation was not taken into account.
Note, too, that subsidies in the IMF Government Finance Statistics sometimes
include transfers to non-profit organisations or welfare funds. The available data is
an imperfect proxy for the level of government support to enterprises and the
indicator should be taken with a considerable grain of salt.12
Figure 1 - Average Annual Net Transfers from
Government to Nonfinancial SOEs






Note: Net transfers from government are defined
as government equity, loans, and subsidies to
SOEs minus SOE dividend and interest pay-
ments to government.
a 1983 for Benin and Tanzania; 1983-84 for Egypt.
Source: World Development Report (1988), p. 170.
all else. ^ When a commercial fraud triggered the first run on banks in 1981, the
government stepped in in a piece-meal fashion and did not strengthen
supervisory regulations. The large contributions to state owned financial
institutions occurred at a time, when lending to the private sector had virtually
stopped, while public corporations still increased capital expenditures
substantially (Dohner and Intal, 1989; Bisat et al., 1992). Rather than a one-off
increase in the national debt, the Philippines opted for a continuous stream of
Dohner and Intal talk of "crony capitalism" in this respect.13
transfers and consequently recorded large budget deficits for several years in a
row. Hence the speed of fiscal consolidation and the track record of fiscal
deficits for several years also is an important indicator, of how tough the
government was able to be with ailing SOEs.
In this respect we should note, that SOE losses are often due to price controls on
their products. The case of Turkey is illustrative. When the Turkish reform
programme gathered pace in 1982/3, prices for public utilities and intermediate
goods were raised substantially, reducing SOE losses as shown in Figure 1
(Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). However, by 1986/7 SOEs had reached the elastic
part of the demand curve for their products and further price increases were
simply inflationary, without improving public revenue. As the necessary
restructuring had not taken place in SOEs in the meantime, public deficits,
fuelled in part by rising SOE losses increased again (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989).
In sum, both fiscal deficits and the share of subsidies in government
expenditures give more or less adequate reflection of direct budgetary transfers
to loss makers.
Second, subsidies may be provided through the financial system. It is well
known that a large number of DCs have maintained negative real interest rates
for a considerable period of time. This provides an incentive for loss making
firms to cover their liquidity gap through short term finance, and it channels
scarce capital into long term investments that bear very little return. Without
much need for further elaboration we can establish that the level of real lending
rates is an important element of soft budget constraints. ^
Apart from the costs of credit, interventions in the allocation of loans may also
constitute an element of budget softness. As we argued before, politically
powerful enterprises may have preferential access to government support, and
hence to directed credit. We assume that SOEs in particular might benefit from
preferential treatment in access to outside finance, if for instance budgetary
considerations limit the extent to which direct subsidisation seems feasible.
Indeed, SOEs are often excluded from central government balances and their
transactions with the government transfered to extrabudgetary accounts (World
Development Report 1988, chapter 8; Nunberg, 1991; Tanzi, 1992). In such a
case, the relative share of the public sector in total credit compared to its
importance in GDP may give an indication of selective preferences for SOEs in
Kraft and Vodopivec (1992) relate soft budget constraints in Yugoslavia to the
large share of fixed interest long term debt in enterprise financing. Negative
financial costs emerge as the crucial aspect of budget softness in their analysis.'14
the credit market. Thus we include this indicator in our assessment of budget
softness in DCs.
The third way by which uncompetitive firms may be shielded from competitors
is trade protection. At first glance it does not seem clear, why this should be
included in an assessment of budget softness. It does present a microeconomic
distortion, but it should create similar and relatively stable conditions for all
enteiprises, rather than favouring some at the expense of others. But we know
from the literature on rent seeking (Krueger, 1974) that trade protection may be
provided selectively as an element of political patronage.
1
7 This applies in
particular to quantitative restrictions (QRs). Unfortunately, sectoral data on the
degree of effective protection, including QRs, is hardly available on a
comparative level. However, as Michaely et al. (1991) have shown, there is a
significant correlation between a high level of absolute protection and relatively
wide differences in sectoral protection rates. Moreover, aggregate measures of
protection at least reveal the degree to which import competing firms are
preferred to exporters. Overall, the fact that we do not observe loose financial
discipline in an economy, or any of the associated macroeconomic phenomena,
does not indicate that budget constraints are entirely hard. Rather, in an isolated
economy, which additionally has high domestic entry barriers, the pressures for
exit are obviously much reduced if not inexistent. Hence, the issue of budget
softness does not really arise. It is therefore important to include an indicator of
trade protection in any macroeconomic assessment of soft budget constraints in
an economy.
There are a host of indicators pertaining to the issue of trade protection. Most of
them are computed for one point in time. This limits their applicability to the
study at hand, as we attempt to analyse the change in budget softness over time
as a contributing factor in the success and sustainability of economic reforms.
1
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In order to obtain a usable time series we computed import penetration ratios for
all the countries in our sample. ^ Because this indicator suffers from a large
country bias (large countries have a lower trade share in GDP and hence a lower
import penetration ratio), we additionally used the share of trade taxes in
For a summary of the classic case of India see The Economist (1991).
This limitation applies for instance to the widely used Learner index (Edwards,
1989; Levine and Renelt, 1992) and to the country size weighted tariff rate used by
Lee (1992). Similarly, effective protection rates and data on quantitative
restrictions are restricted to selected years.
These are defined as imports/GDP - net exports. For an exact definition of all
indicators see Section 4.15
government revenue as an indicator for tariff protection. This indicator will
typically be smaller for large, less open countries (Burgess and Stern, 1992). It
has the additional benefit of capturing the domestic taxing ability of the
government, which, as we established above, may be an underlying cause of
budget softness in the area of taxation.
The indicators derived above provide a useful background for the empirical
analysis that follows in Section IV. Before we proceed to the empirical tests,
however, let us turn to the classification of reform experiences in DCs. This will
allow us to form subgroups of successful and less successful adjusters, which we
expect to be associated with harder and softer budget constraints respectively.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES SINCE 1976
We recall that our three central hypotheses concerned the unsustainability of
stabilisation, the higher transitional costs of liberalisation, and the slower overall
growth performance in economies with soft budget constraints. In order to
structure the empirical analysis that follows, this section will broadly classify a
sample of 41 DCs according to general economic performance, and according to
stabilisation and liberalisation episodes.
Table 2 divides the entire sample by annual inflation and per capita GDP growth
rates over the 1977-1989 period and two subperiods. We can observe that there
is a small degree of correlation between price stability and GDP growth per
capita. Korea and Thailand emerge as the best performers over the whole period,
Uruguay, Ghana, Argentina, Peru, and Sierra Leone fared worst. The two
subphases take into account the exogenous shocks of the early 1980s. For most
DCs the rise in oil prices in 1979/80 triggered balance of payments problems
that were aggravated by the collapse of several commodity prices in the late
1970s and the unprecedented rise in the real cost of foreign borrowing resulting
from the shift in monetary policies in the industrialised countries in 1981 (Sachs
et al, 1989). We have thus taken 1982 as the first year of adjustment under the
new set of relative prices. Following our hypotheses, we are interested in the
determinants of success in reallocating resources after the shock and resuming
sustained growth with price stability. Looking at Table 2 we can see that Korea's
and Thailand's overall success is clue to their outstanding performance during the
1982-89 period. At the lower end of the table the number of high inflation














































































































































Source: UNCTAD (1989); IMF, International Financial Statistics (1990).17
Ghana which have escaped the low growth - high inflation trap. If the 1982-89
subperiod is further divided to account for late adjusters, Kenia and the
Philippines move from medium inflation and low growth to medium growth and
low inflation. Chile's recovery is also impressive with a 5 per cent per capita
growth rate 1986-89. On the other hand Turkey suffers an inflation relapse (sec
Rodrik, 1991) and Egypt moves into recession. Overall, we have ample
documentation for the slow down of DCs growth in the 1980s, which has led
many to call it a "lost decade" for the Third World. The negative correlation
between inflation and growth rates has become slightly more pronounced during
the 1980s, suggesting that gradual or half-hearted stabilisation measures may
have exacerbated adjustment costs, not least because a certain degree of budget
softness was maintained.
This impressionistic first evidence directs our attention at the nature of
adjustment in our country sample. We hypothesised, that only countries that
manage to harden budget constraints during the process of economic reform are
likely to reap sustained gains. This contention is supported in part by an earlier
study on the effects of price distortions on economic growth (Agarwala, 1983).
It was found that countries that had low protection for manufacturing, a small
urban bias, low exchange rate variability, positive real interest rates, a moderate
rate of real wage increases in line with labour productivity growth, reasonable
rates of return on public utility investment and low inflation tended to grow
faster during the 1970-80 period. Table 3 summarises these results in a
composite distortion index
2
0 for 30 countries. Growth and inflation rates are also
given. The last column indicates, whether an economic reform programme has
been put in place during the following decade. In some cases a "+" in brackets
accounts for a belated adjustment, the effects of which are yet to materialise
fully.
Table 3 serves as a benchmark for a typology of economic reforms and
structural adjustment in the 1980s. Evidently, countries with fairly low
distortions during the previous decade would not be required to reform as
radically and ardently as countries with a legacy of extreme interventionism.
Their on average better economic performance should also have served to lessen
20 This was computed as the non-weighted average of seven areas of distortions,
which were assigned values of one to three corresponding to low, medium antfrrigh
distortions. See Agarwala, 1983, for details.18







































































































































a Adjustment effort was subjectively assigned on the basis of Table 4. A "+" denotes
sustained adjustment effort, a "(+)" adjustment too recent to judge sustainability, a "-"
stands for reversal or no adjustment, and a "?" was assigned, where information was
lacking. For references see Table 4.
Source: Agarwala (1983).
the effects of the oil shock and hence the costs of economic adjustment. As
Michaely et al. (1991) have shown, indeed, most liberalisation attempts in DCs19
have followed a period of extreme crisis, characterised by either a political
upheaval, a balance of payments crisis, high inflation, or a combination of all.
We have followed their categorisation in attempting to divide the countries in
our sample by initial conditions (Table 4). Additionally, we have classified the
reform episodes during 1976-1989 according to the sustainability of adjustment.
Sustainability, here, is defined as non-reversal of an economic liberalisation
package over a period of several years (Michaely et al., 1991).21 We do, of
course, expect a positive relationship between the sustainability of economic
reforms and their effectiveness, i.e. improved economic performance. In this
sense, our evaluation of programme sustainability relates to the performance
criteria employed in previous stuclies (World Bank, 1988; 1990; Balassa, 1989;
Mosley et al., 1991). Indeed, our second hypothesis concerned the nature of
transitionary costs in terms of reduced growth rates and lower investment shares
in GDP, which were posited to be negatively related to budget softness.
However, the results of economic adjustment may only be felt with a lag even in
successful cases (e.g. Bruno and Meridor, 1990; Summers, forthcoming). What
matters fundamentally for the length of this lag and the success of the entire
reform is its credibility and irreversibility (Corbo, 1991; Funke and
Nunnenkamp, 1992; Guidotti and Vegh, 1992). We maintain that, as long as soft
budget constraints in one area exist, the mounting tension on resources will
ultimately spill over into the entire economy and previous reforms are likely to
be reversed. Hence soft budget constraints imply low credibility (see Funke,
1992) and higher transition costs, if the reforms succeed at all.
A final classification concerns the nature of the reform package. Two broad
categories, shock vs. gradual, denote the time profile of adjustment. A shock
programme typically will seek an immediate solution on various fronts, while
gradual reformers may proceed by single sectoral adjustments.22
21 Michaely et al., (1991) report that a programme that was sustained for more than
six years was unlikely to be reversed later. Some countries in our "sustained"
category have only seen a few years of reforms, but we considered the chances for
ultimate success positively. In Table 4 the years given in brackets indicate the peak
reform period and in cases of failure the end of the programme.
22 Some of the classifications remain rather ambigous. Korea and Thailand, for
instance, did follow a broad approach to reform, albeit involving a careful
sequencing of trade liberalisation and capital market liberalisation (Bisat et al.,
1992; Mosley et al., 1991). Hence, they should lie somewhere between shock and
gradual. The heterodox stabilisation programmes of Brazil and Argentina of the
mid 1980s have been labelled as gradual, although the effects of the price freeze
were felt on all fronts immediately. We tried to avoid the tautology of taking a
shock programme to be synonymous with reform consistency. Our classification is
anything but rigid and stays as close to the literature as possible. Several countries































Turkey (1980-4) Ghana (1983-8) GROUP B
Chile (1974-81) Nigeria (1986-91)
Mexico (1985-9) Costa Rica (1981-) Poland
Philippines (1985-9) Mauritius (1984-7)
Jamaica (1986-8) Israel (1985-9) Bulgaria
Argentina (1989-) Venezuela (1989 -)






Kenia (1980-4) Cote d'lvoire (1981-3)
Jamaica (1977-83) Brazil (1986/7)






Yugoslavia (-1990) GROUP C
Source: Michaely et al. (1991); World Bank (1988; 1990); Sachs ed. (1990; 1991); Bruno ed. (1990); Mosley et al. (1991); Fontaine ed. (1992).21
Table 4 presents the results of our classification. We can confirm Michaely's et
al. (1991) contention that reforms are more likely to start from a crisis. However,
some of the most successful reformers have persuaded gradual adjustments,
typically starting with a real devaluation, followed by a stabilisation package.
Once excess absorption had been reduced, trade liberalisation and capital market
reforms followed (see Sachs et al. eds., 1989; Bisat et al., 1992). We also see
that there were virtually no sustained reforms that attempted a weak or gradual
solution from an initial situation of crisis. Half hearted attempts were followed
by failure or reversal in the perpetual inflation-stabilisation cycles of Brazil and
Argentina (Bruno et al., 1991), and in many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,
reforms were doomed to failure due to an extremely inefficient public sector,
that was unable to absorb a series of very heavy exogenous shocks during the
1980s (Mosley et al., 1991). But even the broad liberalisation programmes in the
Southern Cone during the late 1970s all ended in financial crises due to reform
inconsistencies, which triggered reversal except for the case of Chile. We argue
that soft budget constraints may have been a primary reason for reform failures.
The three very broad categories that seem to emerge are: successful gradual or
shock reformers with more or less stable initial conditions (Group A), successful
shock treatments starting from a crisis situation (Group B), and reform failures
either due to half hearted attempts in a gradually deteriorating environment, or to
inconsistent or partial reforms followed by a renewed crisis (Group C). We can
now fit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into this typology. Thereby
we caution against swaying generalisations. There are huge differences between
for instance the thoroughly industrialised economies of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, or Poland, and reformers such as Ghana, Nigeria, and even some of
the second generation NICs. Having said this, where do the emerging market
economies (EMEs) fit?
Czechoslovakia^ and Romania were fundamentally stable up to 1990, with a
very low external debt, a tradition of balanced budgets, and in the former case a
relatively small monetary overhang. Czechoslovakia introduced all major
reforms at once.
2
4 Reforms have so far been sustained, but severe worries
persist about future developments in the newly founded Slovakian Republic. In
Romania reforms are proceeding at snail's pace, if at all. We therefore put
Czechoslovakia has since split into two independent republics. As our classification
refers to reforms undertaken largely before the end ot 1992, we shall nonetheless
treat it generally as one country.
See Funke, 1993 for an overview of the reform profile in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Hungary. See also Bruno, 1992.22
Czechoslovakia into the A-Group, awaiting further developments in the two new
republics, while Romania falls into the "no-reform" category. Slightly less stable
and hence more comparable with DCs is Hungary, which followed essentially
the gradual strategy of some of the Asian economies (e.g. Indonesia, see Woo
and Nasution, 1989), managing the current account over a series of small
devaluations, gradually opening up to foreign trade, and smoothing the
adjustment process with the largest share of Central European foreign capital
inflows up to date. Reforms here, too, have been sustained, but growing fiscal
deficits have recently brought the country in opposition to IMF advisers, who
stress the priority of price stability. The importance of fiscal austerity in
underwriting trade liberalisation, due to its effect on the real exchange rate is by
now well understood (Michaely et al., 1991; Schweickert, 1991). The trouble
may not be over for Hungary yet.
At the other end of the spectrum of initial conditions are Poland, Bulgaria, and
Russia (including several other CIS Republics, which we omit in this
discussion). All three have experienced very rapid inflation, after the relaxation
of price controls, and simultaneously have been unable to service a large foreign
debt, casting a shadow over their balance of payments position. Poland has
bitten the bullet and introduced a shock programme at the start of 1990, which
so far has been sustained, inspite of growing fiscal problems and considerable
inertia in the adjustment of the public sector (Raiser, 1992). As in Hungary the
course of events will have to be closely followed to assess, whether Poland will
avoid the scenario so characteristic of exchange rate based adjustment
programmes in Latin America (Corbo and de Melo, 1985; see also Corbo, 1991).
Bulgaria is struggling, but no reversal has been observed yet. Thus it joins
Poland in Group B. Russia, finally is going the way of Brazil and Argentina
during the mid 1980s, when the inability to contain the monetisation of
consolidated public sector deficits, including credit expansionsto SOEs led the
path to hyperinflation. It therefore gets an unambigous C classification.
Let us now turn to some empirical tests of the hypotheses formulated in Section
I. The above typology will be helpful in forming country subgroups that should
be associated with different degrees of budget softness. This will prepare the
ground for some elementary econometric tests.23
IV. TESTING FOR THE EFFECTS OF BUDGET SOFTNESS ON
REFORM SUSTAINABILITY, INFLATION AND GROWTH
I) Constructing a Budget Softness Index
In Section II we derived a set of indicators for soft budget constraints by
associating the microeconomic aspects characteristic of budget softness with
some stylised macroeconomic phenomena. The exact definitions of the budget
softness indicators are given in Table 5. It additionally presents the benchmarks
used to construct a budget softness index (see below). In the discussion of these
indicators we mentioned that some of them might point in opposing directions
and even contain contradictory information within themselves. Thus as a first
task, we tested for the explanatory power of each individual indicator in terms of
a set of four performance variables, namely per capita GDP growth (Y), the rate
of inflation (INF), the share of investment in GDP (INVR) and the variability of
inflation measured by its standard deviation (STINF). Period averages were
computed for all variables and a sample of 41 countries for the years 1977-89.
Table 6 below presents the correlations between budget softness indicators and
the selected performance variables. The most important result is that the
evidence gained from the individual indicators is highly ambigous. Some
indicators such as the budget deficit (DEFR) and the other two fiscal indicators
(IMDR and SUBR) apparently do not explain much of the variance in economic




How can we explain the rather poor results of these first correlations? First, there
may be structural or institutional differences between countries that outweigh the
importance of soft budget constraints in explaining economic performance. This
still leaves the possibility that the variance within countries during the respective
period might be better explained by our indicators. Indeed, one of our initial
hypotheses, supported by the analysis in Section III, was that the degree of
budget hardening within one country during the process of economic reforms
25 Most interesting is the "wrong" sign of the coefficient for real lending rates (RCR).
It seems that real lending rates proxy for lack of monetary deepening or financial
distress, a conclusion supported by the significance of the interest spread (ISP) in
explaining inflation and price volatility. When real deposit rates were included as
an alternative, its coefficient was significantly negative against inflation and the
standard deviation of inflation. The lesson for financial sector reform is, that what
matters are low but positive interest rates, implying both incentives for savers and a
low interest spread (see Corbo, 1991).24
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book of International Trade Statistics, Supplement 1987.
was crucial in supporting sustained and successful adjustment. When the
indicators were computed annually and correlated with per capita GDP growth,
inflation and the investment share in a pooled cross-section analysis, the
significance of the coefficients improved somewhat (Table 7).
Second, each indicator only measures one particular aspect of budget softness,
or rather proxies for it rather imperfectly. Hence, one is likely to get ambiguous25
Table 6 - Cross Section Correlation Coefficients between Budget Softness Indicators









































for the definition of variables, see
Source: Own calculations.
Table 7 - Correlation Coefficients between Budget Softness Indicators and Selected







































results, if for instance the hardening of budget constraints in one area was offset
by softening in another. Depending on the relative strength of these two forces,
economic performance would be differently affected. Unless the stronger
tendency is in the direction of hardening of budget constraints, we would expect
that even conventional measures of market oriented policies, such as moderate
budget deficits, would not be highly correlated with the relevant performance
variables. This insight provided the basic justification for trying to aggregate all
indicators into one composite measure of budget softness. Thereby, two
problems had to be solved. On the one hand, the absolute numbers had to be
linearised to be aggregatable. On the other hand, we had to remember that for
the concept at hand, alterations at the margin are less important than broad
systemic differences. For instance, for the degree of budget softness it hardly
matters, whether all credit goes to the government or just 95 per cent of it, or
whether real lending rates are -10 or -20 per cent. Both considerations pointed us
in the direction of the methodology applied by Agarwala (1983) to measure the
effect of price distortions on growth. His approach has been widely criticised for
involving unacceptable subjective judgements. However, this shortcoming was
considered to be an advantage for our' purpose, because it would allow us to26
establish broad categories, just as in the previous section, so that groups of
countries rather than individual cases could be compared. We must warn the
reader explicitly from interpreting too much into the empirical results that
follow. The signs of the numbers are important not their magnitudes.
Agarwala (1983) proceeded as follows: He singled out seven areas of price
distortions and attributed an index number ranging from 1 to 3 for low, medium
and high distortions respectively to each country for each of the seven
indicators. We did exactly the same, merely replacing the indicators of price
distortions with our eight measures of budget softness (Table 5). In this way we
obtained 8 numbers from 1 to 3 for each country and each year 1977-89.
2^
These were aggregated and divided by the number of indicators to obtain an
index of budget softness for each country and each year. This data set formed
the basis for all the empirical work in the remainder of this section.
2) Soft Budget Constraints and the Costs of Adjustment
The first test for the usefulness of our budget softness index was to correlate it to
the same performance variables that we used, when testing for the
macroeconomic effects of its components in the previous section. As all
indicators were assigned an equal weight in the computation of the index, it was
of interest to see, whether they would cancel each other out, or whether a
consistent picture would emerge concerning the macroeconomic effects of
budget softness. To this effect, an average budget softness index was computed
for each country for 1977-89 and three subperiods. As Table 8 reveals, the
budget softness index is negatively correlated with growth and investment and
has a positive relation to inflation and price volatility. This suggests that the
costs of economic adjustment, as measured by this set of performance variables
were significantly higher in countries that scored badly in terms of budget
softness. This is the case in spite of the ambiguity resulting from similar
correlations using the sub-components of the SBDI index and provides renewed
justification for the approach chosen here. Hence, we find at least
impressionistic evidence in support of the contention in our second hypothesis,
that what matters for the costs of adjustment is the simultaneous tightening of
budgetary restrictions in all relevant areas.
26 For some years information on some indicators was missing. The computed budget
softness index did, in this case include only seven or six components.27
Table 8 - Cross Section Correlation Coefficients Between Budget Softness Index

































per cent; see text for calculation of the index, S
Source: Own calculations.
A further interesting aspect of Table 8 is the fall in significance of the
correlations between GDP per capita growth, and the investment share
2^ and the
SBDI index in the 1986-89 sub-period. It seems that budget softness has a
depressing effect on economic activity particularly in the immediate aftermath of
a relative price shift. When producers are shielded from new competitive
pressures resulting from a sudden increase in costs, such as the one experienced
in 1979, allocative efficiency suffers, resources are blocked in antiquated
equipment and new entrants find it difficult to establish themselves on the
market. Over time, however, as the shift in relative prices is perceived to be
permanent, some reallocation does take place, the need to immediate and
extensive protection may be somewhat reduced, and even countries with larger
degrees of budget softness may grow. The positive correlation of the SBDI
index with the price variables is not altered in the latter part of the 1980s. Hence,
while it matters for the costs of adjustment, that measures to harden budget
constraints are introduced at the start of an economic reform programme, soft
budget constraints undermine stabilisation efforts, whatever the timing and
sequencing of reforms.
We may conclude from the evidence gathered so far, that our first two
hypotheses concerning the inflationary effects of budget softness and their
negative impact on the costs of economic adjustment are at least not
Note that Kornai (1980) had originally related budget softness to an unsalable
hunger for investable resources in the "shortage economy". In the context of DCs
and transforming socialist economies the reverse is likely to be true. Without the
close association of rewards with material output targets under central planning,
managers have an incentive to consume their assests if soft budget constraints exist.28
contradicted. We now further qualify that conclusion, by looking specifically at
the sustainability of economic reforms and budget softness.
3) Soft Budget. Constraints and the. Sustainability of Reforms
In order to examine the role of soft budgets in sustaining or undermining
economic reforms, we related the budget softness index to the subgroups of
countries established in Section III. The results are shown in Table 9. The
positive correlation between hard budget constraints, expressed by a low average
index number, and sustained economic reforms is clearly borne out. The group
A countries score best in all three subperiods, suggesting that soft budget
constraints may not only hinder the- adjustment process but actually made
adjustment necessary in the first place. This is confirmed by comparing the
SBDI index between Group B and Group C in 1977-81 and 1986-89. In the first
period both groups had an average index close to 2, while in the second half of
the 1980s the average index of Group B had fallen to 1.75 and that of Group C
risen to 2.2. It is also noteworthy, in this respect, that the average group index
falls less in Group A than in Group B between the 1977-81 and 1986-89
subperiods. It seems that starting from a situation of crisis, characterised by
macroeconomic instability, sustainable reforms require a substantial reduction of
budget softness. Together with the conclusion obtained in the previous
sub-section regarding the costs of adjustment, our analysis leads to a strong
sequencing preference for early and radical reforms in all sectors of the
economy, particularly if the starting point is one of fundamental disequilibrium.
The general confirmation of our first hypothesis gained from Table 9 is further
strengthened by highlighting a few outstanding individual cases. The reduction
in Turkey's budget softness index from 2.39 in 1977-81 to 1.97 in 1982-85 is in
line with the conventional interpretation of Turkey as a showcase for successful
structural adjustment (e.g. Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). However, in the late
1980s the budget softness index has risen again in Turkey. As we argued in
Section II, the microeconomic adjustment was insufficient, particularly in the
public sector, and contributed both to an inflation relapse and a rise in fiscal
deficits. This explains the weaker macroeconomic position, reflected in a higher
budget softness index for 1986-89. Another case of successful adjustment is
Indonesia, which gradually reduced its budget softness index from 1.47 to 1.22.
Thailand, Korea and Malaysia confirm our expectations of reductions in budget
softness in cases of sustained reform. Finally, we note the substantial29









































































































































































a Figures for group averages in brackets refer to averages including Venezuela and Egypt in group C. The cases of
late reforms after 1989 were not counted for group B.
Source: Own calculations, Table 3.
achievements in Jamaica, Morocco, and Ghana, where reforms were sustained
although growth pay-offs were smaller than in East Asia.
2
8
This sub-section has provided additional support for the hypothesis that soft
budget constraints negatively affect the sustainability of economic reforms. We
also know that biidget softness seems to account for part of the differences in
There are few comments to be made about the unambigous increase in budget
softness in all countries of group C with the exception of Kenia. The latter has
never experienced a crisis of Latin American proportions and its standing in this
group is somewhat ambigous. In the rest of the cases half hearted reforms, populist
politics, and public sectors blown out of proportions are all reflected in very high
budget softness scores.30
economic performance across our country sample. Hence, we may argue that the
high correlation between countries with high inflation, low growth, and low
investment rates and countries with a high SBDI index accounts for the high
average budget softness scores in cases of reform failures. As we can further see
in Table 9, it is the reduction of budget softness within countries, rather than its
level relative to other countries, that has contributed to successful economic
reforms, particularly when the starting position was one of crisis. What remains
to be investigated is the role of soft budget constraints in inflation stabilisation
as compared to other policy variables. In particular, the effectiveness of
monetary policy in an environment of budget softness must be studied in order
to substantiate our first hypothesis. Similarly, we will attempt to explain short
run output and investment share reductions taking into account both budget
softness and unrelated exogenous shocks. For this purpose, ordinary least
squares regression analysis on pooled time series data for our sample is used.
4) Soft Budget Constraints and the Short Run Dynamics of Adjustment
The analysis below is based on earlier work by Schweickert (1991) testing for
the effects of different real devaluation strategies in structural adjustment
programmes. Following his approach, we test our budget softness index as an
exogenous variable in three behavioural equations. The tests involve 41
countries for the period of 1978-1989.
2
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The first relates inflation to a constant, the growth of money supply (MG), the
nominal exchange rate (N), the lagged dependent variable, and the soft budget
constraint index (SBDI). Because of a high correlation between money growth
and lagged inflation the specification chosen used first differences in the lagged
inflation rate:
1) inf = A + al *SBDI + a2*N + a3*MG + a4*infl + a5*infl(-l),
where infl = inf - inf(-l).
The aim of this specification was to investigate, whether the inflationary
consequences of maintaining soft budget constraints could be confirmed, when
other exogenous policy variables were accounted for. The most important
variable against which an independent effect of our index was to be tested was
the growth of money supply. Indeed, if the correlation between soft budget
For the pooled cross-cetion regressions the soft budget index was recomputed
without the subsidy component, as data were only available from 1982 onwards.
The appendix shows that this component makes little difference to the country
scores.31
constraints and money growth is high, one of the two should become
insignificant when both are included in the specification. As we elaborated in
Section I, our first hypothesis does not imply that the link between money
supply and inflation is broken. However, with budget softness persisting, ceteris
paribus, for any monetary contraction, the corresponding inflation rate would be
higher.
There is one problem with this argument, because, what we are effectively
testing, is not the impotency of monetary policy per se, but a systemic feature of
an economy, which entails higher inflation rates. The presence of this feature
merely implies that the size of the monetary contraction required to bring
inflation down to a target level is higher. Thus, we cannot explicitly test for time
inconsistency effects, nor do we consider appropriate lag structures. The reason
for this shortcoming is methodological. The restrictions imposed on our data set
by the use of pooled cross section analysis are large. Constructing a model of
price expectations and credibility that is applicable across countries is a
formidable task. The lag structure, too, may depend on individual country
parameters. Under such circumstances testing for the role of budget softness
using a relatively large sample made the use of a very simple model, expanding
on a given methodology, attractive. This does not compensate for the lack of
theoretical precision, but at least it yields results that can be easily interpreted.
3^
The regression was run for the 1977-89 period and the three subperiods (Table
10). As we hypothesised, the SBDI index is positive and significant in all
periods, except the 1982-85 sub-period. Money growth is similarly significant.
The correlation between the two, moreover, is sufficiently small (0.20 for
1978-89) to confirm that budget softness has an independent effect on inflation.
The conclusion is, that countries with soft budget constraints do, indeed,
experience higher inflation rates. However, our results do not show that
monetary contraction is an inefficient instrument in inflation stabilisation. What
they do imply, is, that to bring inflation down under conditions of budget
softness requires a larger monetary effort.
31
in line with Schweickert (1991) we included the lagged endogenous varibale to test
for adaptive price expectations. If anything, the inclusion of the budget softness
index should weaken the importance of inertial effects, as the index may reflect
some of the underlying reasons for inflationary expectations.
The stabilisation programme in Poland fits closely into this picture. Hyperinflation
was rapidly reduced with a tight macroeconomic package, while microeconomic
distortions were only slowly tackled. Therefore, an inflationary floor has persisted
inspite of several turn-arounds of monetary policy. As argued in Raiser (1992) the
cause of this floor can be found in budget softness for Polish SOEs.32


























































































We cannot leave this issue without noting a peculiar aspect of Table 10. The
variability of the coefficients is extremely high between the sub-periods.
Differences in budget softness account for much larger differences in inflation
rates during the latter half of the 1980s, while concommitly the effectiveness of
monetary policy, expressed by the size of its coefficient, is reduced by almost
100 per cent. The results in 1986-89 are biased by the inclusion of a few very
high inflation countries, where real money growth was probably negative or
rather low, while budget softness was fully present (e.g. Argentina, average
annual inflation 1986-89, 911 per cent; Brazil, 586 per cent; Peru 1057 per cent).
These years also bias the results of the regression for the total time period. When
we ran the same regression for the 8 years 1979-86, chosen in the Schweickert
(1991) paper, the coefficient for money growth was much closer to his original
estimate of 0.80, and the coefficient for the SBDI index fell to around 12. Two33
conclusions follow: First, the approach chosen here does not allow any exact
quantification of the policy trade-offs between budget hardening and inflation.
Second, when the variability in inflation rates between countries is large,
including a few cases of hyperinflation, soft budget constraints become the
dominant explanatory variable. Stabilisation programmes should be devised in
reckognition of the enormous benefits to be derived from tackling budget
softness early on.32
Finally, we should note the rather fragile inflationary effect of a nominal
devaluation, which is most pronounced in the 1978-81 sub-period. This can be
attributed to the fact that a number of countries undertook devaluations at the
turn of the decade that co-incided with the exogenous inflationary shock
provided by higher oil prices. However, in the final period the coefficient for N
becomes positive, and hence the direction of the effect remains at least
ambiguous. This should increase the attractiveness of devaluations to redress
external disequilibria. Adaptive price expectations are not present in our sample,
as the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate calculated from 1NF1 and INFl(-l)
is never signficantly higher than unity.
We now return briefly to the issue of adjustment costs. Using pooled cross
section analysis, we wanted to scrutinise our earlier conclusion about the growth
reducing effects of budget softness, when considered alongside other exogenous
variables. As exogenous variables that were assumed to influence growth rates
in the short run, we chose terms of trade shocks (TOTS, defined as the relative
change in import/export prices times the volume of trade in the previous year,
expressed as a share of import value in the present year), net capital flows
(NFCR, the sum of long term and short term capital inflows as a share of
imports), and a dummy for the world recession period 1979-81. The dummy was
used interactively with capital flows (NFCl) to reflect the importance of capital
inflows for absorbing the immediate effects of the oil shock, before any
adjustment measures could take effect. We also included the lagged dependent
variable to test for the influence of a business cycle. The specification was:
2 A look at the way in which the index was derived makes this point obvious. Under
hyperinflation the Olivera-Tanzi effect boosts fiscal deficits, interest rates typically
cannot catch up with price increases, and even trade may be seriously disrupted.
But it is also clear, that only a credible commitment to reduce the monetarisation of
public sector deficits will allow inflation to fall. Even if we admit a methodological
bias, this does not affect our conclusion.34
2) y = dl*SBDI + d2*NCFR + d3*NCFl+ d4*T0TS + e5*Yl, where
NCF1 =D1*NCFR,D1 = 1 for 1979-81
Dl =Ofor 1978, 1982-89
Y1=Y(-1)
The results are presented in Table 11. The negative effect of budget softness on
short run growth is confirmed. The highly significant negative coefficient of
SBDI supports our claim that soft budget constraints increase adjustment costs.
The regression was also run for the three sub-periods. Thereby the significance
of the SBDI index decreased progressively. Our earlier contention about the
importance of tackling budget softness"at the start of economic reforms to reduce
adjustment costs is again borne out. Finally, the R-square is in a reasonable
range. Of course, we cannot with such a model infer anything about long run
Table 11 - Soft Budget Constraints and Short Run





















































a five per cent significance
level, two stars a one per cent significance.
Source: Own calculations.35
growth across countries. As the scope of our paper only extended to the period
of economic adjustment in the 1980s, the computation of our index has not been
extended to cover a time span sufficient for inclusion in a cross-country growth
model. Table 11 does not answer the questions raised by our third hypothesis,
which awaits further empirical research in order to be confirmed.
Of the other exogenous variables included, we should note in particular the high
significance of the interactive dummy variable NFC1, indicating the importance
of net capital inflows to reduce the costs of an exogenous price shock during the
first two or three years of adjustment. On the other hand, if soft budget
constraints persist, foreign funds may actually be used to subsidise loss-making
enterprises, and their benefit would be wasted. In the longer run, the effect of net
capital inflows on growth is negligible. Further, terms of trade shocks in our
time period do explain some of the differences in growth performances across
countries and over time. This is in line with results obtained by Summers et al.
(1993) testing a growth model with exogenous shocks in a cross section
analysis.
Table 11 also reports the results of a regression, replacing GDP growth per
capita with the share of investment in GDP (INV) as the dependent variable. In
the list of independent variables, we included the lagged endogenous variable
alongside lagged GDP growth, following the specification of Schweickert
(1991). Again the SBDI index is significantly negative.
3
3 The overall conclusion
from these two tests is, that soft budget constraints do impose short run costs on
an economy. These costs seem to be higher during and shortly after an
exogenous shock has imposed the necessity for economic adjustment on a
country. No conclusive evidence was gained with respect to the long run growth
effects of soft budget constraints.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND LESSONS FOR EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES
The paper set out to present a new framework for the analysis of economic
adjustment processes. The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe is
the most extreme case of economic adjustment we know of, both in terms of the
scope of systemic transformation, involving economy and polity at the same
time, and in terms of the extent of the price shock administered with the opening
to Western markets. The lessons to be drawn from DC experiences have to be
The significance level of this relationship falls, too, as we move towards the second
half of the 1980s.36
seen in the light of administrative and institutional constraints in EMEs,
emanating from the simultaneity and the size of the tasks required.
Having said this, the first conclusion from our analysis is that economic reforms
should not aim at only one particular issue at the time. Policy makers must
realise that loss-making enterprises have a variety of avenues at their disposal,
through which they can ensure survival. Hardening budget constraints must
involve making survival much more difficult for notorious parasites. The
bundelling of various indicators of budget softness in one composite index has
proved to be a useful analytical tool, that may conveniently be adopted for
monitoring purposes in economic policy. It may moreover enhance the
government's credibility by making progress highly visible in one single number.
Second, inflation stabilisation suffers from the presence of budget softness. We
could not conclusively show, how budget softness leads to reform
inconsistencies and makes stabilisation unsustainable. This will be the task of
devising a model of an economy with soft budget constraints. However, the case
studies presented at the start of the paper have highlighted the role of
microeconomic incentives in supporting macroeconomic austerity. The positive
correlation between the budget softness index and inflation supports that
contention.
Third, the costs of protecting loss makers are particularly serious at the start of
economic reforms. This may explain, why stable countries like West Germany
have been able to live quite well with some industries being heavily reliant on
subsidies from the state, while the inability to reduce the subsidisation of public
corporations effectively has broken the neck of a series of reformer governments
in DCs. The sequencing proposal to be derived from the last two points falls
broadly into the "shock" variety. Our typology has shown, that particularly in
countries, where the initial disequilibrium is large, sustained economic reforms
and successful structural adjustment have involved a relatively abrupt exposition
of domestic producers to competitive pressures alongside macroeconomic
stabilisation. This implies that a significant fall in budget softness at the start of
an economic reform programme both makes the success of stabilisation more
likely and reduces the costs of adjustment.
Fourth, when behavioural patterns determine the success of economic reforms,
institutional aspects come to stand in the limelight of the policy debate. While
market prices are the most accepted and conventional means for creating
incentive structures conducive to allocative efficiency, instruments that ensure
contract enforcement and monitor the economic behaviour of agents are crucial37
to make economic policy measures work. Market imperfections resulting from
perverse behaviour, that may ultimately be traced to budget softness, can be
detected in looking at some specific macroeconomic indicators. However, policy
makers should make constant efforts to test the adequacy of these indicators and
attempt to improve measures that test for behavioural patterns directly.
Particularly for reforming economies the monitoring capacity of the government
and its hold on microeconomic information is essential.
After these four general points, let me close with a few remarks regarding
Central and Eastern Europe. First, stabilisation has been successful in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Within the group of the three frontrunners in
systems transformation, differences in inflation rates can, however, be attributed
in part to different degrees of budget softness (Raiser, forthcoming). In this
respect indications of financial markets imperfections, such as rising interest
spreads, or a disproportionate share of SOEs in bank credit should be taken
extremely seriously by policy makers. Lack of payments discipline must be
solved by institutional regulations in the form of bankruptcy rules and clear
property rights and cannot be left to market processes alone. Any indication that
troubled firms may be bailed out by the government may put the entire
stabilisation programme at risk, as the case studies presented in Section II have
shown. Second, the output costs of economic reforms have been extremely high
by any DC standards. In this situation it is vital to remember, that the hardening
of budget constraints is not responsible for the recession in Central Europe. The
neighbouring countries to the East bare evidence to the fact, that a continuation
of subsidies jeopardises stabilisation and increases output falls.
Finally, the most promising way to deal with the problems of the "no-exit
economy" is to lower the barriers for entry. Poland's little growth success in
1992 and the expected upturn in the Czech Republic are both attributed to the
rising share of private enterprises in domestic production. Eliminating
loss-makers in the state sector sets resources free to be absorbed by new
ventures. The guarantee of private property rights is the fundamental basis for a
bouyant private sector. Institutional impediments, such as lengthy restitution
processes should be avoided. Moreover, foreign competition should be accepted
as an important ingredient of an innovative and competitive economy. Western
European partners in turn are urged not to erect new barriers to the exchange of
goods and knowledge, by trying to protect their domestic producers from new
competitors in the EMEs. Strict rules regarding exit and low barriers for entry
are the foundations of a prosperous and open European house.38
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